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We consider the economic implications of a compressed wage struc-
ture which is exogenously determined by institutions. An important
feature of our analysis is that human capital is endogenous and can
be achieved either as formal education or as informal training within
firms after entering the labour market. While institutional wage com-
pression decreases the incentives of individuals to become educated, it
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable focus on the increasing wages
of educated workers relative to uneducated workers in the US, and more
generally in the OECD, see, e.g., Welch (1999) — though in most European
countries, the tendency towards increased wage inequality has been less pro-
nounced, see OECD (1996) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). In the
academic literature, it is by now generally agreed that the skill-biased tech-
nological change of recent decades is the underlying cause of this trend in
wage inequality, see, e.g., Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Berman,
Bound, and Machin (1998).
In a recent comparison of OECD countries, Denmark is found to have
the smallest wage ratio between highly educated and uneducated workers
(OECD, 2002).1 Furthermore, the average wage of educated workers has ac-
tually been decreasing relative to the average wage of uneducated workers
over the last 20 years in Denmark as documented by Malchow-Møller and
Skaksen (2003). In addition to this, Denmark has the lowest tertiary gradu-
ation rate in the OECD area with only 9.2% of a cohort obtaining a tertiary
type A education, while the corresponding figures for the US, the UK and
Germany are 33.2%, 37.5%, and 19.3%, respectively.2 More importantly, the
increase in the tertiary graduation rate has been more modest in Denmark
than in the OECD on average (OECD, 2002). If the recent decades have ac-
tually been characterised by skill-biased technological change, it seems some-
what paradoxical that the country with the smallest share of individuals with
a long further education and where this share has increased only modestly
has experienced decreasing wage inequality and furthermore has the second
highest GDP per capita in the EU (Eurostat, 2003).
Wallerstein (1999) has recently shown that diﬀerences in labour market
institutions are capable of explaining diﬀerences in wage compression across
OECD countries. More precisely, he finds that centralisation and concentra-
tion of wage setting as well as the coverage of union contracts all serve to
increase wage equality, and when accounting for these factors, other variables
1In Denmark, the ratio of average wages of tertiary educated to uneducated is 1.75,
while it is 2.78 in the US, 2.59 in the UK, and 2.17 in Germany.
2According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), ter-
tiary educations are divided into types A and B, with type A educations being of a longer
and more theoretical nature, e.g. university degrees. It should be mentioned that the
share of a cohort receiving tertiary type B educations is higher in Denmark than in the
other countries. However, the overall fraction of a cohort receiving a tertiary education
(either type A or B) is still only 33.7% in Denmark, while the mean among the countries
included in the sample is 37.1%, and for the US, the figure is 41.5%, see OECD (2002).
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cease to matter.3 With the Scandinavian countries dominating in all three
respects, this can explain why inequality is lowest in Denmark, but does it
also explain the observed patterns of change in inequality, i.e. the reactions
to skill-biased technological change?
In this paper, we pursue the empirical finding of Wallerstein (1999) by
exploring how an institutionally induced wage compression can account for
the diﬀerent outcomes with respect to education, inequality and GDP, re-
ported above. An important feature of our model is that human capital is
endogenous and can be acquired either as formal education before entering
the labour market or as informal firm-sponsored training after entering the
labour market. A more compressed wage structure will lower the incentives
for individuals to acquire education, while raising the incentives of firms to
invest in training of their employees. The eﬀects on the aggregate human
capital level and GDP are thus ambiguous in most cases.
Furthermore, a skill-biased technological change might both increase and
decrease wage inequality, depending on the degree of wage compression in
the economy. While the direct eﬀect of a skill-biased technological change is
to increase wage inequality, composition eﬀects both within and between the
groups of educated and uneducated workers might have the opposite eﬀect
through increased incentives to acquire both training and education. We shall
argue that these results are consistent with the development in Denmark over
the last decades, and that the importance of such composition eﬀects is often
masked in data on inequality.
1.1 Wage Compression, Training, and Education
Before presenting the formal set-up in Section 2, we first take a closer look
at the existing literature on wage compression and training, explaining how
our model relates to this literature.
Wage compression has previously been used to explain why firm-sponsored
general training of workers might arise, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a)
and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999c) among others. This is by now a well-
established result and goes contrary to the Beckerian proposition that only
the workers themselves have incentives to invest in general training. Accord-
ing to this literature, wage compression can arise as a consequence of: a)
search costs; b) asymmetric information about training, abilities and/or ef-
fort; c) interaction between general and specific skills; and d) labour market
institutions such as trade unions, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) for an
3Wallerstein (1999) oﬀers a range of economic, political, and ideological explanations
for his results.
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overview. As Wallerstein (1999) shows, the latter cause of wage compression
finds most support in the data, and therefore forms the basis of the present
analysis.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) analyse the implications for general train-
ing of wage compression caused by a specific type of labour market institu-
tion: A minimum wage. In their model, a minimum wage provides incentives
for the firms to invest in training of individuals with productivities (abil-
ities) below the minimum wage, since the firm in this case is the residual
claimant of any increases in productivity. On the other hand, a minimum
wage prevents some workers from investing in training since training must be
financed through wage cuts, which are no longer feasible. In sum, however,
the introduction of a minimum wage might increase overall training.
In this paper, we take the analysis one step further by considering the
implications of wage compression for training as well as education, and by
analysing the reactions to skill-biased technological change. Furthermore, we
consider a diﬀerent type of institutional wage compression than in Acemoglu
and Pischke (1999b). This is motivated by the results of Wallerstein (1999)
which indicate that labour market institutions aﬀect wage compression more
generally than through a minimum wage. Also Calmfors et. al. (2001)
document that even within Europe, labour market institutions diﬀer along
several dimensions. In some countries, minimum wages are legally binding
and in other countries, trade unions are powerful in wage bargaining with
diﬀerent degrees of centralisation. In this paper, we therefore assume that
labour market institutions impose wage compression not only at the bottom
end, but also at the upper end of the wage scale.
In our model, both education and training are treated as endogenous
choices. We assume a recursive structure where education is decided by and
paid by the individual prior to entering the labour market, while training
takes place after entering the labour market and is financed by the employer.
The assumption of a non-Beckerian world where training can only be financed
by the firm is consistent with our assumption of a wage structure determined
by institutions, as well as a lot of empirical work demonstrating that often
firms do pay for general training, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a).
Since focus is on general training, we view training and education as
perfect substitutes in our model, though in practice, at least some elements of
training will typically be complementary to education. Furthermore, training
is assumed to be general but informal in the sense that a person who receives
training but no education is formally uneducated.
In general, considerable indivisibilities are associated with both educa-
tion and training since both activities typically involve fixed costs — either
monetary or in terms of time invested. More specifically, diﬀerent levels of
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education and diﬀerent types of training come at diﬀerent (fixed) costs. As
a result, important composition eﬀects are likely to arise. To analyse the
importance of these eﬀects while keeping the exposition clear, we assume the
existence of a single educational level and a single training level. Moreover,
the human capital level achieved through training is assumed to be lower
than the human capital level achieved through education.
In Section 2, we set up a simple theoretical model with endogenous edu-
cation and training. This model is solved recursively in Section 3. In Section
4, we derive some comparative statics, and in Section 5, we discuss to which
extent the model is able to explain the recent development in Denmark.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this Section, we set up a simple model to analyse the economic implications
of diﬀerent wage structures. In order to be able to undertake comparative
analyses, we simply assume an exogenously determined wage structure, which
is implicitly determined by labour market institutions. An obvious possibility
is that the wage structure is the outcome of a bargaining process involving
trade unions and employer organisations, but there may be other institutions
which aﬀect the wage structure, such as politically imposed minimum wages
or monopsony power at the labour market, see, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999c).
2.1 Production and Utility
To simplify, physical capital is not included in the model. Production de-
pends solely on labour input. In other words, a firm simply realises the
productivity of a worker.4 The productivity of individual i is assumed to
depend on a weighted average of the input of raw labour and human capital.
More specifically, we assume that:
qi = γi ((1− α) + αhi) (1)
where qi is productivity of individual i, γi is personal ability, and hi is the
human capital level which can take three possible values:
4The model could easily be extended to include capital input. Thus, the production
function can be seen as a reduced form of a constant returns to scale technology.
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hi =



u, if unskilled
τ, if trained
e, if educated
(2)
Note that there is a complementarity in production between raw labour and
ability as well as between human capital and ability. The parameter α is
a measure of the importance of human capital relative to "raw labour" in
explaining the productivity of a worker. An increase in α can therefore be in-
terpreted as a skill-biased technological change in production. To ensure that
a skill-biased technological change increases the productivity of trained and
educated individuals, we assume that e > 1 and τ > 1. Moreover, for analyt-
ical tractability, we assume that u = 0. That is, a skill-biased technological
change is assumed to decrease the productivity of the unskilled.5
Education is assumed to take place before the individual enters the labour
market, whereas training can only take place in a firm. It is assumed that
the human capital level of an educated individual is higher than the human
capital level of a trained individual, e > τ . Hence, it will never be optimal
to train an educated individual. Similarly, the cost of education is assumed
to exceed the cost of training, ce > cτ .
The utility function of individual i is linear:
Ui = yi − cei (3)
where yi is the income of individual i, cei is the cost of education, where c
e
i
equals zero if the person remains uneducated, and cei = c
e if educated. The
cost of education may comprise both a financial cost and an opportunity
cost reflecting the time and eﬀort spent in education. We abstract from any
disutility of working.
Individuals only diﬀer with respect to their ability level, γi, and it is
assumed that γi is distributed across individuals according to a density func-
tion, ϕ (γ), with positive support.
An important assumption in the following is that training must be fi-
nanced by the firm. This is consistent with the assumption of a wage struc-
ture determined by institutions. If it was possible for the worker to pay the
5We would get the same qualitative results by just assuming 0 < u < 1. The assumption
of u = 0 is somewhat "extreme" in the sense that it implies that an increase in α gives rise
to a rather large increase in the productivity diﬀerence between trained and unskilled as
well as between educated and unskilled workers. A priori, this makes it more likely that
a skill-biased technological change will raise wage inequality. We show that despite this
"extreme" assumption, it is possible that a skill-biased technological change gives rise to
a decrease in wage inequality when the wage structure is compressed.
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firm for training, this would indirectly circumvent the institutionalised wage
structure, see also Acemoglu and Pischke (1999c).
2.2 Wages
With respect to wages, we assume that the wage of an employed worker is a
weighted average of a constant, θ, and the productivity, qi, of the worker:
wi = θ(1− β) + βqi, 0 < β < 1 (4)
In a competitive labour market, wages are determined solely by productivity,
which is the special case of (4) where β → 1. In the following, a more
compressed wage structure is synonymous with a decrease in β.
In equilibrium, a worker will only be employed if her institutionalised
wage, wi, does not exceed her productivity level, qi. This implicitly defines
a minimum level of productivity, q∗, required to qualify for a job:
q∗ = θ (1− β) + βq∗ ⇔ q∗ = θ (5)
Since the wage is just equal to productivity at qi = q∗, this is also the lowest
observable wage in the economy. We can think of this as the minimum wage.
The interpretation of the wage-setting equation in (4) is that an individual
with just the required productivity, q∗, will be paid her marginal product —
the minimum wage — whereas more able individuals will be paid less than
their marginal productivity when β < 1.
2.3 Timing
The agents take decisions in four stages or periods. For simplicity, we assume
that there is no discounting between stages.
At stage 1 (the young age), each individual decides whether to incur the
cost of education, ce, and become educated, or to enter the labour market
without education.
At stage 2, each individual meets with a firm. The firm observes both the
ability level and the educational attainment of the individual. Based on this
information, the firm decides whether to oﬀer employment to the individual.
Individuals may choose to turn down an oﬀer and continue to search for a
job at another firm.
At stage 3, firms decide whether to train an employed worker thereby
incurring the training cost, cτ . When training has been completed, employed
workers either stay with the firm or search for a job in another firm. In
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addition, we assume that there is a probability 1− z that a worker moves to
another firm for exogenous reasons.
Finally, at stage 4, production takes place and workers receive their wages
upon completion of the production process.
As discussed in the previous Section, it is assumed that the wage struc-
ture is exogenously fixed. This also implies that at stage 2, firms cannot
credibly commit to a certain training level in stage 3, since this would simply
be a way of circumventing the exogenous wage structure. Similarly, firms
cannot credibly oﬀer sidepayments thereby attracting more profitable (pos-
sibly trained) workers at the end of stage 3. This implies that there are no
expected wage gains associated with leaving a firm, neither at stage 2 nor at
stage 3. Hence, we will simply assume that there are no voluntary quits at
these stages.6
2.4 Parameter Restrictions
Throughout the following, we will impose the following two parameter re-
strictions with respect to the costs of training and education:
cτ >
θzατ
1− α (6)
ce >
µ
1 +
αe
1− α
¶
θ (7)
In the following, it becomes clear that these restrictions imply that the costs
of training and education are suﬃciently high to ensure that some individuals
always remain untrained as well as uneducated .
3 Solving the Model
The model can be solved by backwards induction. At stage 4, an employed
worker, i, receives the wage:
wi = θ(1− β) + βqi
irrespective of the firm she is employed in.
6This can be formally justified by introducing an arbitrarily small but positive search
cost.
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3.1 Stage 3
At stage 3, the firm decides whether or not to train an individual i who was
hired at stage 2. Two situations can be distinguished. First, in the case
where the hired individual is educated, it will never be worthwhile to train
her since τ < e. The expected profit to the firm from hiring an educated
individual i is therefore given by:
Eπei = z (1− β) [γi (1− α+ αe)− θ] (8)
Second, in the case where the hired person is uneducated, the firm chooses
to train the person if the expected profit from training:
Eπτi = z (1− β) [γi (1− α+ ατ )− θ]− cτ (9)
exceeds the expected profit from keeping the individual as uneducated:
Eπ0i = z(1− β) [γi (1− α)− θ] (10)
By comparing (9) and (10), it follows that:
Lemma 1 At stage 3, an uneducated employee will be trained if and only if:
γi ≥ γτ ≡
cτ
z (1− β)ατ (11)
Due to the complementarity between human capital and individual abil-
ity in production, and the fact that the productivity-wage diﬀerential (the
surplus to the firm) increases with productivity, firms will have incentives to
train only the most able of the uneducated employees.
3.2 Stage 2
At stage 2, a firm must decide whether to hire an individual with ability γi,
who might be either educated or uneducated. If the individual is educated,
she will be hired if and only if:
Eπei ≥ 0 (12)
Using the expression in (8), this condition can be rewritten in terms of γi
and stated formally as:
Lemma 2 At stage 2, an educated individual will be hired if and only if:
γi ≥ γeh ≡
θ
1− α+ αe (13)
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On the other hand, if the individual is uneducated, she will be hired if
and only if:
max{Eπ0i , Eπτi } ≥ 0 (14)
By use of the expressions in (9) and (10), and the parameter restriction in
(6), this condition can also be rephrased in terms of γi:
Lemma 3 At stage 2, an uneducated individual will be hired if and only if:
γi ≥ γh ≡
θ
1− α (15)
where γeh < γh < γτ .
Lemmas 2 and 3 state that only the most able individuals will qualify
for employment. Furthermore, the restriction in (6) implies that the cost
of training is suﬃciently high to ensure that only a share of the employed
workers will be trained, i.e. γτ > γh.
3.3 Stage 1
At stage 1, each individual decides whether or not to pay for education. A
distinction is made between three types of individuals. First, an individual
with γi < γh knows that she will never be hired at stage 2 should she remain
uneducated. This follows directly from Lemma 3. On the other hand, her
expected return from taking an education — provided that she is hired at
stage 2 — is given by:
wi − ce = θ(1− β) + βγi (1− α+ αe)− ce
However, the parameter restriction in (7) implies that ce is suﬃciently high to
ensure that this return is always negative for γi < γh. Hence, no individual
with γi < γh will find education worthwhile.
Lemma 4 An individual, i, with γi < γh, where γh is given by (15), will
remain unskilled and unemployed in equilibrium.
Second, an individual with γi ∈ [γh, γτ ] will be hired but not trained at
stage 2. Hence, this individual will choose education if and only if:
θ(1− β) + βγi (1− α+ αe)− ce ≥ θ(1− β) + βγi (1− α)
This condition can be rephrased formally in a Lemma:
10
Lemma 5 An individual, i, with γi ∈ [γh, γτ ], where γτ and γh are given by
(11) and (15), will in equilibrium be: i) unskilled and employed if γi < bγeh;
and ii) educated and employed if γi ≥ bγeh, where:
bγeh = ce
βαe
(16)
Note that bγeh may exceed γτ at some parameter values, in which case, no
individuals in this interval will choose education.
Third, if γi ≥ γτ , an uneducated individual will always be trained at
stage 2. Hence, she prefers education if and only if:
θ(1− β) + βγi (1− α+ αe)− ce ≥ θ(1− β) + βγi (1− α+ ατ)
Lemma 6 An individual, i, with γi ≥ γτ , where γτ is given by (15), will
in equilibrium be: i) trained and employed if γi < bγeτ ; and ii) educated and
employed if γi ≥ bγeτ , where:
bγeτ = ce
βα(e− τ ) (17)
Again, bγeτ might be smaller than γτ for some parameter values, in which
case, all individuals with γi > γτ become educated.
3.4 Equilibrium Regimes
The degree of wage compression, β, aﬀects the incentives for education and
training and hence the sizes of the critical values, bγeh and bγeτ , relative to γτ .
It is straightforward to show that depending on the value of β, three possible
regimes can be identified. The equilibrium outcomes in the three diﬀerent
regimes are summarised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 Let γτ , γh, bγeh, and bγeτ be defined by (11), (15), (16), and
(17), respectively. Furthermore, let:
β1 =
cezτ
cτe+ cezτ
∈ (0, 1) and β2 =
cezτ
cτ(e− τ) + cezτ ∈ (0, 1)
Then β1 < β2, and:
1. If β ≥ β2 (the low-compression regime), then γτ ≥ bγeτ > bγeh, and the
equilibrium choices of education, training and employment are:
• If γi < γh, worker i is unskilled and unemployed.
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• If γh ≤ γi < bγeh, worker i is unskilled and employed.
• If γi ≥ bγeh, worker i is educated and employed.
2. If β1 < β < β2 (the medium-compression regime), then bγeτ > γτ > bγeh
and the equilibrium choices of education, training and employment are:
• If γi < γh, worker i is unskilled and unemployed.
• If γh ≤ γi < bγeh, worker i is unskilled and employed.
• If bγeh ≤ γi < γτ , worker i is educated and employed.
• If γτ ≤ γi < bγeτ , worker i is trained and employed.
• If γi ≥ bγeτ , worker i is educated and employed.
3. If β ≤ β1 (the high-compression regime), then bγeτ > bγeh ≥ γτ and the
equilibrium choices of education, training and employment are:
• If γi < γh, worker i is unskilled and unemployed.
• If γh ≤ γi < γτ , worker i is unskilled and employed.
• If γτ ≤ γi < bγeτ , worker i is trained and employed.
• If γi ≥ bγeτ , worker i is educated and employed.
Proof. By condition (7), γˆeh > γh. Hence, γh < γˆeh < γˆeτ , and from condi-
tion (6), we know that γh < γτ . This defines three possible regimes: 1) γh <
γˆeh < γˆeτ ≤ γτ ; 2) γh < γˆeh < γτ < γˆeτ ; and 3) γh < γτ ≤ γˆeh < γˆeτ , which
can equivalently be expressed as: 1) β ≥ β2; 2) β1 < β < β2; and 3) β ≤ β1,
where: β1 ≡ cezτ/ (cτe+ cezτ ) ∈ (0, 1) and β2 ≡ cezτ/ (cτ(e− τ) + cezτ ) ∈
(0, 1) with β1 < β2. Equilibrium choices of education, training and employ-
ment for the three regimes then follow directly from Lemmas 4-6.
Individuals with a suﬃciently low ability level always end up unemployed.
Moreover, we observe that if the ability level of an individual is suﬃciently
high, she always chooses to become educated — independently of the regime.
For high values of β, the economy is in the low-compression regime, where
training by the firm is never optimal, simply because workers are paid close to
their productivity. In the other two regimes, however, firms invest in training
of individuals who have an intermediate ability level. Furthermore, in the
medium-compression regime, i.e. β1 < β < β2, there will be individuals with
a relatively low ability level who choose to become educated. These persons
are not suﬃciently able to qualify for training, and in order to obtain human
capital, they must invest in education.
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4 Comparative Statics
In this Section, we derive comparative statics with respect to changes in the
degree of wage compression, β, and with respect to the skill bias, α, in the
production function. A low value of β — a high degree of wage compression
— corresponds to a Scandinavian type of country according to the findings
of Wallerstein (1999), whereas a high value of β is interpreted as an Anglo-
Saxon country.
4.1 A Change in Wage Compression
The aim of this subsection is to analyse how a change in β (the degree of
wage compression) aﬀects: i) the number of individuals who are employed,
trained and educated; and ii) total utility.
In all three regimes, the number of employed persons is given by:
H =
Z ∞
γh
ϕ (x) dx (18)
where we recall that ϕ (x) is the density function over individuals with respect
to ability. As stated in Proposition 7, only individuals with an ability level
above γh become employed. In the high- and medium-compression regimes,
the number of trained persons is given by:
T =
Z γˆeτ
γτ
ϕ (x) dx (19)
whereas in the low-compression regime: T = 0. The expression for the
number of educated persons depends on the regime:
Elow =
Z ∞
γˆeh
ϕ (x) dx (20)
Emed =
Z ∞
γˆeτ
ϕ (x) dx+
Z γτ
γˆeh
ϕ (x) dx (21)
Ehigh =
Z ∞
γˆeτ
ϕ (x) dx (22)
where Elow is the number of educated in the low-compression regime, etc.
Note that in the medium-compression regime, there are two intervals of ed-
ucated individuals, cf. Proposition 7.
The eﬀects on the number of employed, trained and educated individuals
of a change in wage compression are stated in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 8 An increase in wage compression (a decrease in β) implies
that:
1. The number of employed persons remains unchanged.
2. In the high- and medium-compression regimes, β < β2, the number of
trained persons increases. In the low compression regime, β > β2, the
number of trained persons remains zero.
3. The number of educated persons decreases.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of the expressions in (18)-(22) using the definitions
of γh, γτ , γˆeh, and γˆeτ .
An increase in wage compression lowers the return to education for each
individual. As a result, we observe a decrease in the number of persons who
become educated. On the other hand, firms have a higher return on training,
and more persons will therefore receive training.
By construction, the minimum wage is not aﬀected by changes in β, leav-
ing the number of employed persons unchanged. Perhaps more realistically,
an increase in wage compression would be associated with a higher mini-
mum wage and increased unemployment, thereby further raising the share of
trained workers among the uneducated with employment.
Since the utility function is linear, total utility (or GDP), Y , can be found
as total production less total costs on education and training. By using the
fact that only individuals with an ability level below γh become unemployed,
and that final productivity and the incurred costs of education and training
of person i can all be expressed as functions of the ability level, γi, total
utility, Y , can be written in short form as:
Y =
Z ∞
γh
(q (x)− ce (x)− cτ (x))ϕ (x) dx (23)
Each regime contains diﬀerent intervals of educated, trained and unskilled
workers. In the Appendix, we provide the exact expression for Y in each of
the three regimes. The eﬀect on total utility, Y , of an increase in wage
compression will therefore also depend on the regime, i.e. the value of β, as
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 An increase in wage compression (a decrease in β) implies
that:
1. If β > β2 (the low-compression regime), total utility, Y , unambiguously
decreases, i.e. dYdβ > 0.
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2. If β < β2 (the medium- and high-compression regimes), the eﬀect on
total utility is ambiguous.
Proof. Follows directly from diﬀerentiation of the expressions for Y in Ap-
pendix A.1 with respect to β, taking into account that γτ , γˆeh, and γˆeτ all
depend on β.
Since β < 1, individuals do not receive the full return from investing in
education. Similarly, since β > 0, firms do not receive the full return from
investing in training. Hence, the equilibrium level of human capital will in
general be inoptimally low. As a consequence, since wage compression tends
to increase incentives for the firms to finance training, whereas it decreases
the incentives for individuals to invest in education, the eﬀect on total utility
of an increase in wage compression is in general ambiguous. However, in
the low-compression regime where there is no training, an increase in wage
compression gives rise to an unambiguous decrease in the level of human
capital and therefore to a decrease in total utility.
It is thus possible that total utility may increase as a consequence of
higher wage compression. Figure 1 contains a numerical example based on a
standard lognormal distribution of individual abilities.7 In this example, the
relative costs of education and training are the same, c
e
e =
cτ
τ =
2
3
, implying
that the results are not driven by training being more "cost eﬃcient" than
education.
For β < 0.47, the economy is in the high-compression regime, where Y
is decreasing in β, i.e. dY/dβ < 0. An increase in β (less compression)
will increase the group of educated while decreasing the group of trained,
cf. Proposition 8. At first glance, this should increase overall utility since
the eﬀect of education on productivity is higher than the eﬀect of training
on productivity; something which is reinforced by the fact that educated
individuals belong to the high end of the ability scale. On the other hand, we
have important composition eﬀects: The decrease in the number of trained
is larger than the increase in the number of educated, since the interval
of trained workers is reduced from both ends. First, the most able of the
trained become educated (γˆeτ drops), and the least able of the trained become
unskilled (γτ increases). The importance of the latter eﬀect is stronger if: i)
the density of the distribution at γτ is high; and/or if ii) the eﬀect of the
change in β on γτ is large, which will be the case if, e.g., the probability of
an exogenous quit, 1− z, is high.
7Parameter values used are: cτ = 1, ce = 1.33, τ = 1.5, e = 2, θ = 0.1, α = 0.6, z = 0.9,
and σ2 = 1, where σ2 is the shape parameter of the standard lognormal distribution.
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As β increases above 0.47, the economy enters the medium-compression
regime. Here, an increase in β is still detrimental to training, but the pos-
itive eﬀects are now more important, since two intervals of educated indi-
viduals are aﬀected positively, cf. Proposition 7. Thus, the composition
eﬀects favouring education are more important in this regime. In the low-
compression regime, β > 0.78, the eﬀect is still positive but less pronounced.
The composition eﬀect favouring education is now smaller since we again
only have one interval of educated individuals. On the other hand, there will
be no detrimental eﬀect on trained individuals in this regime.
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0.01 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71 0.81 0.91
Degree of wage compression, β
βd
dY
Figure 1: The eﬀect on total utility of a change in wage compression, β.
4.2 Skill-Biased Technological Change
Next, we turn to the implications of skill-biased technological change, where
the most interesting questions seem to be how a change in α aﬀects training
and education decisions as well as the relative wages of educated and uned-
ucated individuals. In the productivity function, a skill-biased technological
change, i.e. an increase in α, raises the importance of human capital relative
to raw labour.
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The following Proposition, summarises how a skill-biased technological
change aﬀects the number of individuals who are employed, trained and
educated.
Proposition 10 A skill-biased technological change (an increase in α) im-
plies that:
1. The number of employed persons decreases in all three regimes.
2. In the low- and high-compression regimes, the number of educated per-
sons increases.
3. The eﬀect on the number of trained persons is ambiguous.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of the expressions in (18)-(22) with respect to α using
the definitions of γh, γτ , γˆeh, and γˆeτ .
First, since the productivity of unskilled persons decreases when α in-
creases, a larger number of unskilled persons will not be suﬃciently pro-
ductive to qualify for the minimum wage, i.e. γh increases. Hence, more
unskilled persons become unemployed in response to a skill-biased techno-
logical change.8
Second, education has a higher human capital content than training, and
since the return to human capital increases with α, there is an unambiguous
increase in the number of educated individuals in both the low-compression
and the high-compression regimes. In the medium-compression regime, the
eﬀect is ambiguous because two types (intervals) of educated individuals are
aﬀected: i) high-ability educated; and ii) low-ability educated, cf. Propo-
sition 7. While the former group will grow as α increases, the eﬀect on
the latter group is ambiguous. It will be reduced from above (γτ drops),
since more will be trained, while it will be increased from below (γˆeh drops),
since more of the low-ability individuals will find it optimal to acquire an
education.
Third, the eﬀect upon the number of trained individuals is also ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, it will be optimal for the firms to train more of the
uneducated workers, increasing the group of trained from below (γτ drops).
On the other hand, more persons will choose to become educated, which
tends to diminish the number of trained persons from above (γˆeτ drops).
We now consider the eﬀects on relative wages. The relative wage of two
individuals, i and j, is given by:
wreli,j =
θ(1− β) + β (1− α+ αhi) γi
θ(1− β) + β (1− α+ αhj) γj
(24)
8By construction, the size of the eﬀect on γh is independent of β, but increases with θ.
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where hi and hj are the human capital levels of the individuals.
Proposition 11 A skill-biased technological change (an increase in α) im-
plies that:
1. The wage of a given educated (or trained) individual, i, relative to the
wage of a given unskilled employed individual, j, increases.
2. The wage of a given educated individual, i, relative to the wage of a
given trained individual, j, increases, if γi > γj.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of the expression in (24), using that if person i is
educated or trained (hi = e or τ) and person j is unskilled (hj = 0), then
γi > γj independently of the regime, and e > τ > 1.
An unskilled individual, j, will always have lower ability than an edu-
cated or trained individual, i, γj < γi. Since ability and human capital are
complements, a skill-biased technological change will always raise the relative
wage, wreli,j .
A similar intuition underlies the second part of the Proposition. Note,
however, that in the medium-compression regime, a trained worker j might
have ability, γj, which exceeds that of an educated worker, i. In this case,
their relative wage may drop.
An often used measure of wage inequality is the average wage of educated
relative to the average wage of uneducated workers, e.g. OECD (2002).
Proposition 12 A skill-biased technological change (an increase in α) has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the average wage of educated persons relative to the
average wage of uneducated persons.
Proposition 12 says that even though the wage of a given educated in-
dividual relative to the wage of a trained or an unskilled rises (Proposition
11), the ratio of average wages may decrease. Composition eﬀects are the
underlying cause. First, the average ability of the educated persons tend to
decrease because more persons choose to become educated. This eﬀect tends
to limit the increase in the average wage of educated persons, and can even
reverse it under plausible parameter values. Second, the eﬀect on the aver-
age ability of uneducated persons is ambiguous. The most able persons, who
used to be trained, now choose to become educated, which tends to decrease
the average ability of uneducated individuals. However, the least able un-
skilled individuals become unemployed, which tends to increase the average
ability of uneducated persons. Third, among the group of uneducated indi-
viduals, there will typically be a larger fraction which receives training in the
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medium- and high-compression regimes, and this eﬀect tends to increase the
average wage of uneducated individuals. In sum, the eﬀect on the relative
wage of a skill-biased technological change is ambiguous.
Intuitively, a more compressed wage structure should increase the likeli-
hood of a negative eﬀect on the relative average wage between educated and
uneducated of an increase in α. First, the increase in the return to human
capital is lower when the wage structure is compressed. Second, the group
of trained persons is larger with a more compressed wage structure. This in-
tuition is supported partly by Figure 2, which contains a numerical example
based on the same parameter values as in Figure 1, showing how the eﬀect
on the relative wage depends on the degree of wage compression.
The relative wage decreases at small values of β in the high-compression
regime, and again in the medium-compression regime, where the group of
educated individuals consists of two sub-groups: High-ability individuals and
low-ability individuals, and where the positive wage eﬀects on the latter group
of an increase in α are limited due to their lower personal abilities.
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Figure 2: The eﬀect of a skill-biased technological change on the average
wage of educated relative to the average wage of uneducated, as a function
of the degree of wage compression, β.
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In a more general model with many diﬀerent levels of education and train-
ing, similar eﬀects would be observed. A skill-biased technological change will
in general aﬀect the incentives to acquire human capital — both through ed-
ucation and training, where the latter becomes increasingly important with
a compressed wage structure. As a result, the compositions of the groups
of educated and uneducated will change: More will be trained (educated) or
receive a higher level of training (education) in response to a skill-biased tech-
nological change This can have significant eﬀects on not only average wages,
but also the diﬀerent percentiles in the wage distribution. If a skill-biased
technological change implies that the workers with only a little or no train-
ing become better trained, it is for example perfectly possible that the 5th
percentile in the wage distribution increases relative to the 95th percentile.
5 The Danish Labour Market
As argued in the Introduction, the development at the Danish labour market
is particularly interesting as it appears to be very diﬀerent from the devel-
opment at, for instance, the US labour market. In this Section, we discuss
to which extend the above theoretical model is able to explain the Danish
experience.
First, Denmark has the second largest GDP per capita in the EU and,
at the same time, has the smallest wage diﬀerence between educated and
uneducated workers. This is fully consistent with the above model as we
found that utility (or GDP per capita) may be high both when the degree of
wage compression is high and when it is low.
In the rest of this Section, we focus on the implications of a skill-biased
technological change. In the literature, it is well established that the recent
decades have been characterised by skill-biased technological changes, and
that this is one of the main explanations behind the increasing wage inequal-
ity observed in the US, see, e.g., Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998). In Table 1Statistics Denmark (2000),
we summarise the development in average wages at the Danish labour market
in the period 1980 to 1998. We choose to focus on persons with a long further
education (i.e. the most highly educated persons) and persons without any
education except lower-secondary school. It is seen that the average wage of
educated workers has actually been decreasing relative to the average wage
of uneducated workers.9 Above, we found that if the degree of wage com-
9The development in average relative wages can be heavily influenced by changes in de-
mographic compositions within groups, and for instance the age composition is important.
Therefore, we report the development in the relative wage for a fixed demographic compo-
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pression is high, it is likely that a skill-biased technological change gives rise
to a decrease in the average wage of educated workers relative to the average
wage of uneducated workers. One important reason for this is that a skill
biased technological change implies that firms get an increased incentive to
train uneducated persons, and that this composition eﬀect implicitly raises
the average wage. At the same time, similar composition eﬀects with respect
to education are typically eliminated in the data by using fixed weights with
respect to the distribution on level and type of education.
1980-89 1989-98 1980-98
Relative wage change of educated* -0.36 0.01 -0.17
Real wage changes:
Uneducated:
16-24 years -0.76 0.30 -0.23
25-34 years -0.27 -0.09 -0.18
35-44 years 0.17 0.01 0.09
45-54 years 0.24 0.32 0.28
55-64 years 0.50 0.56 0.53
Educated:
25-34 years -0.17 -0.35 -0.26
35-44 years -0.61 0.14 -0.23
45-54 years -1.01 -0.22 -0.61
55-64 years -0.91 -0.05 -0.48
Table 1: Wage Development at Danish Labour Market (yearly 
percentage change)
Source: Statistics Denmark (2000) and own calculations. Educated are defined as persons with 
a long further education. Uneducated are persons with only a lower secondary education.
* The wage rate of educated persons relative to the wage rate of uneducated persons using 
fixed demographic weights
Table 1 also indicates that training of uneducated workers has been in-
creasingly important. In practice, training is an ongoing process implying
that productivity, and in turn wages, will be increasing in experience. In Ta-
ble 1, we see that there has been an increasing wage premium to experience
sition within each of the two groups, i.e. for a fixed age distribution, gender distribution
and, for the group of educated, a fixed composition with respect to type of education, see
Malchow-Møller and Skaksen (2003) for details.
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among uneducated workers during the 1980s and 1990s as real wages of older
workers have been increasing faster than real wages of younger workers. The
same development is not observed among educated workers, indicating that
there has not been the same tendency for increased training of this group.
Another prediction of the theoretical model of this paper is that skill-
biased technological change implies that an increasing share of the unskilled
will not be able to find employment. In Table 2, we report the development in
non-employment rates for Danish men. We focus on men as the employment
rates for women have been aﬀected by an increasing tendency for women to
participate at the labour market which is due to other factors than skill-biased
technological change. We observe that there has been an overall tendency for
non-employment rates for men to be decreasing, but we also see that this is
much more pronounced for uneducated men than for educated men. Hence,
this seems to confirm that it has become increasingly diﬃcult for uneducated
men to find employment.
Table 2: Non-Employment Rates of Danish Men, 16-64 years
1980-89 1989-98 1980-98
Total 19.6 23.8 24.5
Educated 10.6 11.7 12.0
Uneducated   27.2 35.3 39.0
Source: Statistics Denmark (2000) and own calculations. Educated are defined as persons with 
a long further education. Uneducated are persons with only a lower secondary education.
Table 1 and 2 only provide indirect evidence of the importance of training
in the Danish labour market. OECD (2000) gives some more direct evidence
for this by considering the actual literacy skills of workers and not just their
formal education. First, it is found that the skills of the formally uneducated
workers is much higher in Denmark than in, for instance, the US. Second,
Denmark has the lowest inequality in skills in the survey of 22 OECD coun-
tries. Third, Denmark is the country where most workers participate in
job-related education (or training) after entering the labour market. Finally,
it is found that in Denmark, firms more often pay for job-related education
than in, e.g., the US. All this seems to indicate that training (or job-related
education) is more important in Denmark than in the US — especially training
of uneducated workers.
22
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the economic implications of a compressed
wage structure which is exogenously determined by institutions. An impor-
tant feature of our analysis is that human capital is endogenous and can be
achieved either as formal education before entering the labour market or as
informal training within firms after entering the labour market. While insti-
tutional wage compression decreases the incentives of individuals to become
educated, it increases the incentives of firms to invest in training. As a result,
the net eﬀects of wage compression on the aggregate human capital level and
GDP are ambiguous.
Another result is that skill-biased technological change may have very
diﬀerent eﬀects in an economy where wages are compressed compared to
an economy where wages to a larger extent reflect the productivity of work-
ers. We actually find that with wage compression, a skill-biased technological
change may cause wage inequality to decrease. The possible decrease in wage
inequality arises because a skill-biased technological change has a number of
composition eﬀects within and between the groups of educated and unedu-
cated workers. In particular, more will receive training within the group of
uneducated workers.
In the analysis, we assumed only one level of education and training. In
reality, a large number of diﬀerent levels of education and training exist.
When observing statistics on relative average wages, it is often possible to
control for most composition eﬀects within the group of educated workers by
using fixed weights with respect to the distribution of workers on educational
level and type. On the other hand, since training of uneducated workers is
often informal, and therefore remains unobserved in statistics on the quali-
fications of these, it is not possible to control for composition eﬀects within
this group. In countries where wages are compressed, and informal train-
ing within firms therefore play an important role, skill-biased technological
change may give rise to significant but unobserved skill-upgrading within the
group of workers who are formally uneducated. This will make it even less
likely that skill-biased technological change increases the observed average
wage of educated labour relative to uneducated labour.
We confronted the predictions of our model with the recent development
in Denmark, which it seems to explain very well. In Denmark there is a high
degree of wage compression, and the GDP per capita is relatively high. More-
over, the relative wages of educated workers have been decreasing while they
have been increasing in most other countries. Finally, it has become increas-
ingly diﬃcult for especially uneducated workers to find a job in Denmark.
These developments are all explained by our model.
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A Appendix
This appendix contains the expressions for total utility and average wages of
educated and uneducated workers in each of the three regimes.
A.1 Total Utility
In the low-compression regime, total utility, Y , is given by:
Y low =
Z bγeh
γh
x (1− α)ϕ(x)dx+
Z ∞
bγeh x (1− α+ αe)ϕ(x)dx−
Z ∞
bγeh c
eϕ(x)dx
(25)
whereas in the medium-compression regime, total utility becomes:
Y med =
Z bγeh
γh
x (1− α)ϕ(x)dx+
Z γτ
bγeh [x (1− α+ αe)− c
e]ϕ(x)dx
+
Z bγeτ
γτ
[x (1− α+ ατ)− cτ ]ϕ(x)dx+
Z ∞
bγeτ [x (1− α+ αe)− c
e]ϕ(x)dx
(26)
and in the high-compression regime:
Y high =
Z γτ
γh
x (1− α)ϕ(x)dx+
Z bγeτ
γτ
[x (1− α+ ατ )− cτ ]ϕ(x)dx
+
Z ∞
bγeτ [x (1− α+ αe)− c
e]ϕ(x)dx (27)
A.2 Average Wages
In the low-compression regime, the average wages of educated and unedu-
cated workers, respectively, are:
w¯elow =
1
1− Φ(bγeh)
Z ∞
bγeh [θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ αe) x]ϕ(x)dx
w¯ulow =
1
Φ(bγeh)− Φ (γh)
Z bγeh
γh
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α)x]ϕ(x)dx
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where:
Φ (γ∗) =
Z γ∗
0
ϕ (x) dx
In the high-compression regime, the average wages are:
w¯ehigh =
1
1− Φ (γˆeτ)
Z ∞
γˆeτ
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ αe)x]ϕ(x)dx
w¯uhigh =
1
Φ (γˆeτ)− Φ (γh)
µZ γτ
γh
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α)x]ϕ(x)dx
+
Z γˆeτ
γτ
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ ατ )x]ϕ(x)dx
¶
and in the medium-compression regime, they are:
w¯emed =
1
1− Φ(bγeτ) + Φ (γτ)− Φ(bγeh) ·µZ ∞
bγeτ [θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ αe) x]ϕ(x)dx
+
Z γτ
bγeh [θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ αe)x]ϕ(x)dx
¶
w¯umed =
1
Φ (bγeτ)− Φ(γτ) + Φ(bγeh)− Φ (γh) ·ÃZ bγeh
γh
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α) x]ϕ(x)dx
+
Z bγeτ
γτ
[θ (1− β) + β (1− α+ ατ) x]ϕ(x)dx
!
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